In this paper, we propose a robust and verifiable multi-authority secret voting scheme which meets the requirements of large-scale general elections. This scheme uses a uniquely blind threshold signature scheme to get blind threshold electronic votes such that any voter can abstain from voting after the registration phase. It also uses the threshold cryptosystem to guarantee fairness among the candidates' campaigns and to provide a mechanism for ensuring that any voter can make an open objection to the tally if his vote has not been published. In this scheme, the computations among voters are independent and voters only have to send an anonymous message to the counter after the registration phase. This scheme preserves the privacy of a voter from the counter, administrators, scrutineers and other voters. Completeness, robustness and verifiability of the voting process are ensured and hence no one can produce a false tally or corrupt or disrupt the election.
INTRODUCTION
Due to the fast progress of Web technologies, many conventional activities such as shopping, education and elections can be conducted over the Internet. However, networked general elections will never be widely accepted unless there is a protocol that can preserve voters' privacy as well as prevent others from cheating. Since electronic votes can be easily duplicated, it is necessary to prevent malicious or careless voters from casting multiple votes. Simply issuing a unique identification number to each voter in the election scheme would disclose the privacy of the voters. To overcome this difficulty, many cryptographic protocols have been proposed [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] . Another required feature in electronic voting schemes is that each voter can verify the voting result. When a voter finds that his/her vote has not been properly counted by the counter, he/she can make an objection to the counter or other voters. In considering the performance of voting processes, the effort required by a voter must be minimized. While governments can support a large organizational effort to hold elections, the voting process should be as simple and efficient as possible for the voter, e.g. he/she can participate in an election at home using his/her personal computer.
In a real large-scale general election, some voters may abstain from voting after the registration phase. In this case, if the issue of votes is controlled by a single administrator, he/she may add extra ballots as he/she wishes. To overcome this problem, the issue of votes must be controlled by several administrators. To guarantee fairness among the candidates' campaigns, the whole election process must be monitored by some chosen scrutineers. This approach will ensure that no one can get extra information of the tally result before the publication phase.
In this paper, we propose a robust and verifiable multiauthorities secret voting scheme for real-world environments with the following properties: (a) this protocol involves voters, a counter, some administrators and some scrutineers; (b) if some voter finds his/her vote has not been properly counted, he/she can make an open objection to the counter via a public channel; (c) voters can abstain from voting after the registration phase; (d) this protocol is fair, i.e. no one can get extra information about the tally result before the publication phase; (e) this protocol is collision free, i.e. a ballot of an eligible voter is always accepted by the counter; (f) this protocol preserves the privacy of a voter from administrators, the counter, scrutineers and other voters; (g) it is robust in that no voter can disrupt or corrupt the election.
In our proposed scheme, the computations among voters are independent without the need of any global computation; a voter only has to communicate with the administrators and finally send his/her vote to the counter. This protocol is therefore suitable for large-scale general elections. By our scheme, all participants, voters, administrators, scrutineers and the counter, can express their true intentions or execute related voting affairs at any time and at any place, e.g. from homes and offices or through mobile equipment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, previous work on secret ballot schemes is reviewed and in Section 3 some of the existing tools in the literature that we use in our scheme are described. In Section 4, we present our secret ballot scheme and in Section 5 the properties of our scheme are examined. We then present some discussions in Section 6. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
RELATED WORK
Secret voting protocols have been investigated by many researchers from both the practical and theoretical points of view. In [1, 7, 9] , some boardroom voting schemes have been proposed where voters send encrypted messages back and forth until they all agree to the outcome of the election. In these schemes, all procedures are managed by the voters. However, if any voter stops following the protocol during the voting the election is disrupted. In [2] , Fujioka et al. proposed a secret ballot protocol which is more suitable for large-scale general elections since the computation and communication overheads are small even if the number of voters is large. In this scheme, each voter must send two anonymous messages to the counter, but in the schemes [4, 5, 6, 8] each voter only has to send one anonymous message to the counter. In [3] , Iversen proposed a voting scheme, which preserves the privacy of the voters from the administrator and other voters. The drawback of this scheme is that if all candidates conspire, the privacy of the voters is violated.
For the ability of protecting the privacy of the voters, blind signature techniques [10, 11, 12, 13] are widely adopted to secure voting schemes [2, 4, 5, 8] . A distinguishing property required by a typical blind signature scheme [10, 11, 12, 13] is so-called the 'unlinkability', which ensures that the requesters can prevent the signer from deriving the exact correspondence between the actual signing processes performed by the signer and the signatures which are later made public. The signed blind messages can be regarded as tickets in applications such as secret elections. If the contents of the signed messages are the same, these signed messages will be regarded as only one ticket. In [4] , Juang and Lei use the concept of blind signature and one-way permutations combined with voters' identifications to realize a uniquely blind signature scheme. Based on the scheme, they have proposed a collision-free secret ballot protocol for computerized general elections. The essential drawback of this scheme is that if the administrator is not trustworthy, he/she may buy votes from the voters who have not registered if necessary before the publication of the result. In [8] , Sako proposed another approach in which a voter can make his/her objection via a public channel, but her method cannot guarantee fairness among the candidates' campaigns or hide the objector's privacy from the administrator. In [5] , Juang and Lei use the threshold cryptosystem to guarantee fairness among the candidates' campaigns and to provide a mechanism for ensuring that any voter can make an open objection to the tally if his/her vote has not been published.
Baraani-Dastjerdi et al. [14] proposed a multi-authorities voting scheme using threshold schemes for achieving the fairness property. In [14] , there is a need for a trusted authority to distribute secret shadows to each candidate. Also in this scheme, voters have to send N anonymous messages to N candidates and an anonymous message to the counter after the registration phase. If the administrator is not trustworthy, he/she can add extra ballots to the tally when some voters abstain from the voting process after the registration phase in this scheme.
The schemes proposed in [2, 6, 8, 14] are not collision free, [4, 6, 8] are not fair and [1, 3, 6, 7, 9] are not practical for large-scale elections. In all single authority voting schemes [2, 4, 5, 6, 8] , voters cannot abstain from voting after the registration phase. If they do it, the authority can add extra votes as he/she wishes.
Cramer et al. [15] proposed a voting scheme, based on homomorphic encryption and proofs of knowledge, which is suitable for large-scale elections since the computation and communication overheads are small even if the number of voters is large. The property of this scheme is that if t authorities conspire, where t is the threshold value of the threshold cryptosystem generated by n authorities, the privacy of the voters is violated. This protocol is not a general election protocol since the intentions of voters are only either 'Yes' or 'No'. Where there are several options, the computing of the individual ballot and the final tally is in general more complicated.
In [16] , Benaloh and Tuinstra proposed a receipt free secret ballot protocol and voting booths in which no more than a single voter can stay at the same time. In their protocol with multi-authorities, no one can coerce the voters into changing their intentions. Again, however, this protocol is not a general election protocol since the intention of any voter is only either 'Yes' or 'No'. Niemi and Renvall [17] proposed a receipt-free secret ballot protocol based on zeroway permutations and multiparty computation. In their scheme, each voter needs to compute about 10 3 modular exponentiations when the number of candidates is 10 in the registration phase. Sako and Kilian [18] proposed a Mixtype voting scheme which is receipt-free and universally verifiable. One basic assumption of their scheme is that there exists a physical secure private channel from the tally centre to each voter.
BASIC TOOLS
Here we recall some existing techniques that we use in our voting scheme.
Threshold cryptosystems without a trusted party
In a threshold cryptosystem, n members share a group secret key of an organization such that t members (1 ≤ t ≤ n) can cooperate to decipher a given ciphertext or make a group signature. Distributed key generation is the main building block of threshold cryptosystems. The first distributed key generation for threshold cryptosystems without a trusted party was proposed by Pedersen in [19] . The basic idea in Pedersen's distributed key generation protocol [19] is to have n parallel executions of Feldman's verifiable secret sharing protocol [20] in which each participant P i acts as a dealer of a random secret z i that he/she chooses. The group secret key z is taken to be the sum of all honest dealers' z i 's. Since Feldman's verifiable secret sharing has the property of revealing y i = g z i , the group public key is the product of all honest dealers' y i 's. In [21] , Gennaro et al. show that Pedersen's distributed key generation protocol [19] cannot guarantee that the distribution of the distributed generated group public key is equal to a uniform distribution. Some part of the group public key can be controlled by an adversary. Gennaro et al. proposed an improved distributed key generation scheme [21] . The basic idea in Gennaro et al.'s distributed key generation scheme is to have n parallel executions of Pedersen's informationtheoretic verifiable secret sharing protocol [22] in which each participant P i acts as a dealer of a random secret z i that he/she chooses. Before each participant P i broadcasts the public verifiable parameters A i,k = g f i,j , 0 ≤ k ≤ t − 1 and t is the scheme's threshold, he commits to a t-degree random polynomial
is a random value chosen by P i and C() is the commitment scheme proposed in [22] . By this approach, an attacker cannot force a commitment by a corrupted participant P j to depend on the commitments of any set of honest participants; also for any participant P i that is not disqualified during the commitment stage, there is a unique polynomial f i (z) committed to by P i and this polynomial is recoverable by t honest participants. By using the information-theoretic verifiable secret sharing protocol [22] , the scheme in [21] can guarantee that no bias in any part of the output group public key is possible.
Blind threshold signature schemes
The concept of blind signature was introduced by Chaum [11] . It allows the realization of some applications in privacy protection, e.g. secure voting systems [2, 4, 5, 8] , preserving voters' privacy, and secure electronic payment systems [11] , protecting customers' anonymity. For distributing the power of a single signer, Juang and Lei [23, 24] proposed blind threshold signature schemes using the concept of Pedersen's distributed key generation protocol [19] and the blind signature schemes proposed in [10] . The basic idea in Juang and Lei's blind threshold signature schemes [23, 24] is to generate a group signature by combining t partial signatures signed by t honest signers. Before any t honest signers can be designated by a group to sign a signature, all n signers must run a secure distributed key generation protocol [19, 21] to obtain their personal secrets. In the signature generation phase, a requester requests a blind threshold signature from the signers and the signer cooperates to issue the blind threshold signature to the requester. Finally, the requester can combine all partial signatures signed by the signers and derive the corresponding threshold signature. Anyone can use the group public key to verify if a threshold signature is valid. One of the underlying blind signature schemes of the blind threshold signature schemes proposed in [23, 24] is the Nyberg-Rueppel blind signature scheme proposed in [10] which we will briefly describe here.
Let m be the blind message to be signed, let p and q be two large strong prime numbers such that q divides (p − 1) and let ρ be a generator of Z * p [25] . Let g ≡ p ρ (p−1)/q , z ∈ Z q , be the signer's secret key and y ≡ p g z be the corresponding public key. The scheme is proposed as follows.
1. The signer randomly chooses a number k ∈ Z q , computes r ≡ p g k and sends r to the requester. 2. After receiving r, the requester:
(a) chooses two random numbers α ∈ Z q and β ∈ Z * q and computes r ≡ p mg α r β and m ≡ q β −1 r; (b) checks if m = 0; if yes, he/she sends m to the signer, otherwise he/she goes back to step (a).
3. Upon receiving m, the signer computes s ≡ q mz + k and sends s back to the requester. 4. After receiving s, the requester computes s ≡ q sβ + α.
The blind signature of m is (r, s).
To verify the signature (r, s), one simply computes m ≡ p g −s y r r and checks if m has some proper redundancy information. If m has no proper redundancy, a secure one-way hashing function H [26, 27] can be applied to m. However, this approach cannot provide the message recovery capability. To verify the blind signature (r, s) on m without proper redundancy, one must send m along with (r, s) to the verifier.
Untraceable e-mail systems
Several anonymous channel protocols [28, 29, 30, 31] have been proposed for protecting senders' anonymity. The mix-net approach is used in [28, 31] to realize a sender untraceable e-mail system. In the mix-net approach, the encrypted messages are sent to a mix agent who will disarrange all received messages and send them to the next agent. Finally, the last agent will send the encrypted messages to their destinations. The basic assumption of the mix-net approach is at least one mix agent is honest. In [32] , Pfitzmann shows several attacks on the anonymous channels proposed in [31] . In the mix-net approach, it is harder to decide whether a sender has not sent his/her message to the receiver through an anonymous channel or whether the receiver has not received it. In practical implementations, if there are audit records in the system, then this problem is solved. Otherwise, a sender can send his/her message to some trusted authorities via the mix-nets. The dc-net method based on the Dining Cryptographers Problem is used in [29] to achieve a sender untraceable e-mail system which is unconditionally or cryptographically secure, depending on whether it is based on one-time keys or on keys generated by public key distribution systems or pseudorandom number generators. In the dc-net method, it does not need any trusted mix-agent, but all potential senders must participate in the mail system when someone is delivering a message. In [30] , Juang et al. have proposed an anonymous e-mail system in wireless communications. The user anonymity in this scheme is neither based on any trusted authority nor on the cooperation of all potential senders.
THE PROPOSED VOTING SCHEME
In this section, we propose a robust and verifiable multiauthorities secret voting scheme for large-scale general elections. In our scheme, blind threshold signatures are used to distribute the power of a single authority, so that voters can abstain from voting after the registration phase. Also, a threshold cryptosystem is used to guarantee the fairness among the candidates' campaigns. The scheme involves voters, one counter, n administrators and ς scrutineers. The scheme consists of seven phases: the initialization phase, the preparation phase, the global key generating phase, the registration phase, the voting phase, the announcement phase and the publication phase. Before an election is held, the counter first publishes all public parameters in this election. During the preparation phase, all administrators cooperate to distribute secret shares to each other and generate their public keys and the corresponding group public key without a trusted third party. In the global key generating phase, all scrutineers cooperate to distribute shares to each other and generate the corresponding group public key without a trusted third party. In the registration phase, voters encrypt their intentions with the group public key generated in the global key generating phase for achieving fairness and apply the uniquely blind threshold signature technique to get their blind encrypted votes from administrators by the secret shares generated in the preparation phase. In the voting phase, voters generate their real encrypted votes from the blind encrypted votes received in the registration phase and send them to the counter via an untraceable e-mail system. In the announcement phase, the counter publishes all accepted ballots. Finally, in the publication phase, if there does not exist any objection, the counter first requests λ arbitrary scrutineers to send their shadow keys generated in the global key generating phase to him/her. When the counter receives these λ shadow keys, he/she computes the scrutineers' group secret key. Then he/she recovers voters' intentions and publishes all real ballots. Otherwise, if the counter is dishonest, the voting process can be reinitialized.
Basic assumptions
The underlying assumptions of this protocol are that: (a) every eligible voter can communicate with all administrators and the counter; (b) there exists a secure and untraceable e-mail system [28, 29, 30] ; (c) there exist a secure blind threshold signature scheme [23, 24] and a secure one-way permutation function [4, 33] ; (d) the RSA (Rivert, Shamir and Adleman) signature scheme is secure [34] and the ElGamal cryptosystem is secure [35] .
All secure untraceable e-mail systems proposed in [28, 29, 30] can be applied to our scheme, but we recommend those systems in [28, 30] since we only need an e-mail system periodically.
The concepts of blind threshold signatures [23, 24] and one-way permutation functions combined with users' identifications [4] are used to realize a uniquely blind threshold signature scheme in our proposed scheme.
For simplicity, the message authentication in our protocol is achieved by the RSA signature system in which the signed message m is attached with its signature Cert S (H(m)), where H is a secure one-way hash function and S is the identification of the signer.
Using the ElGamal cryptosystem, each voter will encrypt his/her ballot by the group public key generated in the global key generation phase for achieving fairness of the candidates' campaigns and to ensure that any voter can make an open objection to the tally if his/her vote has not been published.
Notation
Let n be the number of possible administrators before the preparation phase, QUAL be the set of non-disqualified administrators after the preparation phase and n be the number of non-disqualified administrators in QUAL. Let ς be the number of possible scrutineers before the global key generation phase. Let QualS be the set of non-disqualified scrutineers after the global key generation phase. Let ς be the number of non-disqualified scrutineers in QualS. Assume that there are τ eligible voters. Let µ > n/2 be the threshold value of the blind threshold signature scheme, so that at least (n−µ+1) administrators are honest. Let λ be the threshold value of the threshold cryptosystem, so that at least (ς −λ+1) scrutineers are honest. Let U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n , denote the identification of administrator i before the preparation phase. Let U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, denote the identification of non-disqualified administrator i after the preparation phase. [4, 33] , H be a public one-way hash function [26, 27] and tag be a voting tag indicating the current voting. To make our scheme clear, we assume that the message transmitted in the following protocol is via an authentication scheme (e.g. the RSA signature scheme); that is, no one can fake any other's messages and no one can deny the messages he/she really transmitted.
The proposed scheme

Phase 0 (the initialization phase)
The counter publishes all public parameters n, τ, ς, µ, λ, p, q, g, h, all identifications of eligible voters, scrutineers, administrators and the voting tag tag, the public one-way permutation ξ and the public one-way hash function H. He/she also computes all signatures of these public parameters by his/her secret key d c and publishes these signatures.
Phase 1 (the preparation phase)
In the preparation phase, all U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n , must cooperate to distribute their secret shadows to each other. Each U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n , carries out the following steps.
1. U i chooses a secret key z i ∈ Z q and two secret polynomials
, where x j is a unique public number for U j , secretly to every
from other administrators, he/she verifies if the shares δ j,i and δ j,i received from U j are consistent with the certified values
. If this fails, U i broadcasts that an error has been found, publishes δ j,i and δ j,i , the authentication information of δ j,i , δ j,i and U j . Each administrator except the dishonest administrator U j then marks U j as a disqualified administrator and builds the set of non-disqualified administrators QUAL. 
Every administrator
U i , i ∈ QUAL, broadcasts A i,k ≡ p g f i,k , 0 ≤ l ≤ µ − 1. 5. When U i , i ∈ QUAL, receives all A j,k , j ∈ QUAL, j = i, 0 ≤ k ≤ µ − 1,y, all public shadows j,i , where i and j ∈ QUAL, and the personal public key y i ≡ p A i,0 ≡ p g z i , can then be published by each administrator U i . Without loss of generality, we assume that the n non-disqualified administrators in QUAL are U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It can be done by renaming the index of each administrator U i , i ∈ QUAL.
Phase 2 (the global key generating phase)
In this phase, all S j (1 ≤ j ≤ ς ) cooperate to generate their public keys and the corresponding group public key, and then distribute secret shadows to each other without a trusted third party. The process of the global key generating phase is similar to that of the preparation phase. We only briefly present the process and system parameters here. Let a j be the secret key and θ j (x) ≡ q λ−1 i=0 θ j,i x i , where θ j,0 = a j , be a random secret polynomial chosen by S j . Let F j,i ≡ p g θ j,i . All scrutineers then carry out the same processes as in the preparation phase to distribute their secret shadows to each other. Assume the set of non-disqualified scrutineers is QualS. Finally, S j , j ∈ QualS, can get his/her share ε j = i∈QualS ε i,j = i∈QualS θ i (x j ), where x j is a unique public number for S j . The group public key G p ≡ p i∈QualS F i,0 will then be published. Without loss of generality, we assume that the ς non-disqualified scrutineers in QualS are S i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ς . It can be done by renaming the index of each scrutineer S i , i ∈ QualS.
Phase 3 (the registration phase)
Let I D i be the identification of voter i. In this phase, each voter applies the uniquely blind threshold signature technique to get their blind encrypted votes from µ arbitrary honest administrators. Without loss of generality, we assume that µ out of n administrators requested by voter i are U j , 1 ≤ j ≤ µ. Voter i and U j , 1 ≤ j ≤ µ, then perform the following protocol. 
where ϑ i is the intention of voter i and η i is a random number, chooses three random numbers R i , ϕ i and r i and computes the values 
.
FORMULA 1.
(c) checks if m i = 0; if yes, he/she sends the string 
If s i,j is not valid, he/she has to ask the corresponding administrator to send it again. Otherwise, he/she computes s i ≡ q µ j =1 s i,j .
Phase 4 (the voting phase)
Voter i and the counter do the following. 
PROPERTIES OF OUR SCHEME
Correctness
To prevent an administrator from sending an invalid partial signature to a voter, a partial signature must be checked in step 4 of the registration phase. The following lemma ensures the correctness of partial signatures.
LEMMA 5.1. Voter i's partial signature (r i,j , s i,j ) is valid if U j is honest.
Proof. By our scheme, we have Formula 1.
After the registration phase, the threshold e-vote will be verified by the group public key in step 2 of the voting phase. Lemma 5.2 ensures the correctness of the threshold e-vote. Before we show that our proposed scheme is complete, we first give the definition of a uniquely blind threshold signature scheme. It is clear that the signature scheme used in the registration phase is a uniquely blind threshold signature scheme since this scheme is a blind threshold signature scheme whose signing function is bijective (providing the message recovery capability) and the signed message
DEFINITION 5.2. (Completeness) A secret ballot protocol is said to be complete if the ballot of an eligible voter is always accepted by administrators and the counter.
Based on the technique of uniquely blind threshold signatures, we first show that our proposed scheme is complete. Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that voter i follows the protocol and his/her vote is rejected by the administrators or the counter. In our protocol, the ballot (r i , s i , tag, M i ) of voter i can only be rejected by the administrators either in step 3 of the registration phase or by the counter in step 2 of the voting phase. 
Therefore, we conclude that the secret ballot of Section 3 is complete.
Security analysis
The global key generation phase of Section 3 is based on the distributed key generation protocol proposed in [21] . In [21] , Gennaro et al. have shown that in their proposed distributed key generation protocol the view of an adversary of the protocol is simulatable. The global key generation phase of Section 3 is a secure protocol for distributed key generation. The preparation phase of Section 3 is the same as the distributed key generation protocol proposed in [21] except that it publishes the public shadows ( j,i , where i and j ∈ QUAL) for cheater detection. Lemma 5.3 ensures the security of the preparation phase in Section 3. Proof. The preparation phase of Section 3 is based on the distributed key generation protocol proposed in [21] . In [21] , Gennaro et al. have shown that in their proposed distributed key generation protocol the view of an adversary of the protocol is simulatable. Different from the scheme in [21] , in order to detect when some administrator cheats, the public shadows
, where i and j ∈ QUAL, will be published by all administrators in our proposed scheme. All the public shadows ( j,i ), where i and j ∈ QUAL, can be computed by the public values
Step 4 of the preparation phase. These public shadows will not disclose any extra information concerning the group secret key. The preparation phase of Section 3 satisfies the simulation argument, that is, it is a secure distributed key generation protocol [21] .
Keeping the privacy of voters is the most important property of a secret ballot protocol. Also, the published tally must be equal to the actual result of the election, that is, each voter must vote exactly once and the counter or administrators cannot add extra ballots to the total tally. We now show that our proposed scheme possesses the above properties.
In our protocol, an ineligible voter Alice can try to vote in the following possible ways.
First, in every election, all administrators cooperate to generate different threshold verifiable public keys. If the used ballots of a previous election can be used again, Alice can forge the blind threshold signatures made by the administrators. This clearly contradicts the assumption that the blind threshold signature scheme is secure.
Second, if Alice can pass the check performed by U j , 1 ≤ j ≤ µ, in step 3 of the registration phase, she can forge i . This clearly contradicts the assumption that the RSA signature scheme is secure.
Third, if Alice can forge any valid ballot (r k , s k , tag) in step 1 of the voting phase, she can forge blind threshold signatures generated by U j , 1 ≤ j ≤ µ. This clearly contradicts the assumption that the blind threshold signature scheme is secure.
From the above, no ineligible voters can vote in our protocol.
Next, we describe how we ensure that no voter can vote more than once.
In our scheme, only eligible voters can vote. In the registration phase, since each U j will check that voter i has not registered and the threshold value µ is greater than n/2 , each eligible voter can only request a blind threshold signature from µ administrators. In step 2 of the voting phase, the counter will sort the ballots by M i and preserve only one copy of all duplicate votes. If any eligible voter casts his/her ballot more than once, only one vote will be counted in the total tally. Therefore no voter can vote successfully more than once. To show our protocol is correct, we will first establish a lemma which shows that any λ honest scrutineers S p j (p j ∈ [1, ς], 1 ≤ j ≤ λ) can cooperate to reconstruct the group secret key G s from their shadow keys ε p j (1 ≤ j ≤ λ).
Proof. In the global key generating phase, after S j has received all ε i,j (1 ≤ i ≤ ς, i = j ), he/she verifies that the share ε i,j received from S i is consistent with the published values F i,l for 0 ≤ l ≤ λ − 1 by verifying that
Since g ≡ p ρ (p−1)/q and ρ is a generator of Z * p , g generates a cyclic subgroup S g of Z * p with |S g | = q. From (1), we know that
Let
is the secret polynomial chosen by S j in the global key generating phase. From (2) and the global key generating phase, we know that
From the Lagrange polynomial theorem, given distinct λ pairs (
Since our protocol is complete, no ineligible voters can vote and no voter can vote successfully more than once, an interested voter will vote exactly once. From Lemma 5.4, we know that if λ out of ς scrutineers are honest, the encrypted ballots will be opened correctly in the publication phase. The counter must publish all registrations and ballots in the publication phase. Since at least (n − µ + 1) administrators are honest, no one can fake a blind threshold signature. The administrators and the counter cannot add any extra ballot to the tally. The total number of ballots must be less than the total number of the registrations. Therefore, the published tally is equal to the actual result of the election.
In our protocol, a malicious person may try to derive the intention of voter i in the following possible ways: (1) (r i , s i , tag, M i , V i ) is computationally infeasible since it clearly contradicts the assumption that the blind threshold signature scheme is secure.
Deriving ID i from the ballot (r i , s i , tag, M i , V i ) of voter i is computationally infeasible since it clearly conflicts with the assumption that ξ is a one-way permutation function.
Deriving the source address of the ballot (r i , s i , tag) is computationally infeasible since it clearly conflicts with the availability of a secure untraceable e-mail system.
From the above, the privacy of voters in the secret ballot protocol of Section 3 is preserved. Now, we want to show that the scheme satisfies the fairness property. Proof. The global key generation phase of Section 3 is based on the distributed key generation protocol proposed in [21] . In [21] , Gennaro et al. have shown that in their proposed distributed key generation protocol the view of an adversary of the protocol is simulatable, that is the adversary who corrupts up to λ − 1 scrutineers cannot get any information concerning the group secret key G s . The voting will not be affected since every interested voter i's encrypted ballot (r i , s i , tag, M i ) must be published in the announcement phase and no votes can be added after the beginning of the publication phase. By the assumption that the ElGamal public key cryptosystem is secure, the proposed voting scheme is fair.
The only way for a voter to disrupt the election is to make an open objection in the publication phase since every voter does not communicate with each other and they only have to communicate with the administrators before the voting phase. In the voting phase, since the data communication can be recorded in audit records, if some voter does not send his/her ballot to the counter in the voting phase he/she cannot make an objection to the counter. Therefore, if the counter is honest, no voter can disrupt the election. In realworld voting environments, the counter's credit is very important. If voters find that the counter has maliciously published a wrong tally result, then the voting process can be reinitialized. Furthermore, due to the fairness property of the proposed scheme, no one can get any partial information about the election before the publication phase.
DISCUSSION
In real-world environments, it is hard to find a single trusted party. Also, every candidate's campaign must be fair, that is no one can get any extra privilege from the voting process, so the voting process must be monitored by some scrutineers. In some critical situations, it is very hard to find a scrutineer. In these cases, every voter can play the role of the scrutineer and join the global key generating phase. Also, in a largescale general election, voters may abstain from voting after the registration phase. Since our proposed scheme uses blind threshold signatures as e-votes, if at least (n − µ + 1) administrators are honest, no one can fake e-votes and voters can abstain from voting.
Performance considerations
In our proposed voting scheme, every voter will request a blind threshold signature as the vote. The preparation phase and the global key generating phase only have to be executed once and can be done off-line. Since the size of a blind threshold signature is the same as the size of an individual signature and the verification process of a blind threshold signature is equivalent to that of an individual signature, the blind threshold signature scheme used in our voting scheme is optimal with respect to the threshold signature size and the verification process. Whilst signing a blind threshold signature, each administrator needs to compute only one modular exponentiation in our schemes 3 which is the same as in the underlying blind signature scheme. Comparative to the underlying blind signature scheme, the extra cost for signing a blind threshold signature is to compute
) in step 3 which contains n − 2 modular multiplications and n − µ additions. If the final threshold signature cannot pass the verification equation, the partial signature verification equations would be verified. The dishonest administrators can be found later. In this approach, the requester only needs to compute two modular exponentiations and one modular inverse in step 2 of the signature generation phase which is the same as in the underlying blind signature scheme. Since the blind threshold verification functions of our schemes are all the same as those of the underlying blind signature schemes, the verification cost of our blind threshold signature is the same as that of the underlying blind signature. Comparative to the underlying blind signature scheme, the extra cost for requesting a blind threshold signature in our blind threshold signature scheme is to compute µα i , Table 1 illustrates the comparison of the blind threshold signature scheme and its underlying blind signature scheme. In our scheme, the computations among voters are independent and voters only have to send an anonymous message to the counter after the registration phase. Our proposed scheme is suitable for large-scale general elections.
Receipt-free secret ballots
In [16, 17] , two receipt-free voting schemes were proposed. The basic idea of the schemes in [16, 17] was the same.
Before an election, a registration phase is executed. During this phase any voter is physically separated from everybody else and a zero-knowledge technique is used to give each voter some secret information. This secret information is later needed to cast the real vote. Since any voter is not able to prove to anybody which secret information he/she obtains in the registration phase, the desired property follows. In [18] , another receipt-free voting scheme was proposed. The basic assumption of physical separation is replaced by a milder one: the tally centre must have a physical secure private channel to each voter. However, it is not known how to provide these channels if the voter is not physically separated from potential buyers of his/her vote at any stage. It is clear that if there is no voting booth in a voting system, then the voting system is not receipt-free. The reason is that the buyer only has to participate in the voting process when the voter is voting. It is clear that our protocol is not receipt-free. If voter i wants to sell his/her vote to a buyer, he/she only has to disclose the random value η i generated in step 2 of the registration phase to the buyer. The buyer can check if the intention contains this value. In secure blind signature schemes [10, 11, 12, 13, 23] , to achieve the uniqueness property, every requester must choose a random value and embed it in the signed message. The voter (the requester) can give the random value to the authority (the signer) as a receipt. So all secure ballot protocols [2, 4, 5, 8] based on blind signatures cannot satisfy the receipt-free property.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a robust and verifiable multi-authority election scheme for a computerized general election which provides fairness, completeness, privacy, robustness, verifiability and soundness. In our scheme, registered voters can abstain from voting and any voter can make an open objection to the tally without disclosing his/her privacy if his/her vote has not been published. In addition, our protocol is collision free. Our scheme is suitable for large-scale general elections since the communication and computation overheads are small even if the number of voters is very huge.
